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THE SECRETARY PROBLEM WITH A CALL OPTION*
Johns. Rose
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University of Richmond
In addition to accepting or rejecting a candidate arriving at
timer, we may consider purchasing an option at a cost ex to recall
the candidate at time r+x, but this privilege may be invoked only
once.

For large sample size, using the best-choice criterion and

deducting option c:osts, the optimal strategy and return are
obtained.
Secretary problem, optimal choice, recall
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1.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The classical model of the secretary problem can be found in
Gilbert and Mosteller [3, Section 2a] or De Groot [2, pp. 325-331],
and its solution is reviewed briefly in the next section.

A

restrictive assumption of the model is the impossibility of recalling previously rejected applicants.

This restriction was

relaxed by Yang [7].: at any stage of the process we may attempt to
recall a previously rejected applicant, whose availability is
uncertain and (maybe) stochastically decreasing in time.

Others

have subsequently extended Yang's work; see Corbin [1] or Petruccelli [5].

A different approach to the recall issue is proposed

here.
Let n be the population size and suppose that, at some stage
m, we observe an applicant which is preferable to the m-1 previously
sampled, and rejected, applicants.
candidate (for the best).

Then, this applicant is a

If we select (reject) the candidate,

then we risk (not) finding a better one among the n-m applicants
yet unsampled.

In order to mitigate this risk, we may purchase an

option granting us the privilege to recall the candidate at stage
m+k, k=l, ••. , n-m.

The cost to acquire such an option is bk, b~O.

If the option is acquired, we say that we are holding the
candidate fork periods; the interval {m+l, .•• , m+k} is called the
holding period.

The essential operational difference between our

model and Yang's is that we must decide at the time of observation
whether or not we shall later have the option to recall the
candidate.
1

In Rose [6], the call options were renewable, so it was sufficient to consider only the one-stage holding period, k=l.

Here,

we expressly prohibit renewal so that the duration, k, of the
holding period becomes a crucial decision variable •. Consequently,
if no better applicant is observed during the holding period, the
option will be exercised and the candidate selected - clearly, in
this context, it is suboptimal to purchase an option and then let
it expire.

Should a better applicant appear during the holding

period, then we might take out another option to recall this new
candidate, giving rise to the rather awkward situation in which
two, or even more, applicants are being held simultaneously.

This

phenomenon is under investigation and will be reported on elsewhere; to avoid that complication here, assume that we are permitted to hold only one candidate.

Then, a better applicant appearing

during the holding period will be accepted or rejected according
to the classical procedure.

Our goal is to determine at what

stages a candidate should be held, and for how long, in order to
maximize the probability of selecting the best applicant less the
holding costs.
In the next section, letting n+<x> and b+O such that nb+c, the
infinite model is derived from the finite problem introduced
above.

The solution to the infinite model is summarized in the

following theorem, whose proof is relegated to Section 3.

The

function U(•) defined on (0,1] denotes the optimal return function;
see (1) and (8).

The dependence of U on c is suppressed.
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THEOREM I.
U(r)=max{e

If c~l, then the classical procedure is optimal and
-1

II.

, r}.
For OSc<l, there exist s 1 (c) and s 2 (c), with

O<s 1 ss 2 <1, such that, for a candidate arriving at timer, it is
optimal to:

, rss 1 ;

a.

reject

b.

hold until . time r/c, s 1 <rss 2 ;

c.

hold until time 1, s 2<r<l,

provided that no candidate has been held previously.

Furthermore,

d.

III.

e.

there exists c 1~.32136 such that c 1 e

f.

s 1 (c)=s 2 (c) if and only if csc 1 ;

g.

s 1 and s 2 are increasing inc.

-1

<s 1 <e

-1

For OSc<l, there exist t 1 (c), t 2 (c), t 3 (c), t 4 (c),

with O<t 1st 2st 3st 4 <1, such that
a.

U(r)=U(tl), rStl;

b.

U(r)=cr+e

c.

U(r)=cr+e

d.

U(r)=cr-rlog c, t 3 <rst 4 ;

e.

U(r)=cr-rlog r+r-c, t 4 <rSl;

f.

U(O)Se- 1 +e- 312 .

.

-1
-1

+rlog r/c, t 1 <rst 2 ;
+r-c, t 2<rst 3 ;

Note that, from (II.a,e), applicants arriving prior to c 1 e

-1

or approximately 12% of the population, will be rejected automatically, even if the option cost, c, vanishes.

Holding a candid-

ate too soon, we may encounter a better applicant before time
3

,

e

-1

, in which case nothing has been gained - the new applicant

will be rejected according to the classical procedure.

There

would be no such lower bound on s 1 (c) if several applicants could
be held simultaneously.

Even when c=O, the maximal return is only

e- 1 +e- 312 , the upper bound in (III.f), which is a relative
improvement of about 60% over the classical return, e

-1

•

Again,

if options could be taken on several applicants, then we should
get U(O)=l for c=O.
Also, consider (II.b,d,f).

If c is not too small, then there

are times, r, for which it is optimal to hold for a period r/c-r,
which is only part of the time remaining, 1-r.
result with those of [1

i

Contrast this

Special Case C-Additively Decreasing

Recall, p. 21), in which it is optimal to observe the entire
population before attempting recall, or of [6], in which it is
optimal to renew the option until the end of the process and only
then to exercise it.

According to (II.d,e), we should hold a

candidate appearing somewhat earlier thane
later thane

-1

-1

until some time

, which is the critical cut-off time for the classical

problem (see (7)).

Finally, it is implied in (II.a,b,c) that a

candidate is accepted immediately upon its arrival only if the
call option alternative was used to hold an earlier applicant.
Numerical solutions of the finite problem
are displayed in Table 1.

Fortunately, these results

are fairly well approximated by the solution of the infinite model
as given in the Theorem.
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2. FINITE AND INFINITE MODELS
The optimality equations follow from the customary backward
induction argument of dynamic programming.

Keep in mind that our

(net} return is 1 or O minus option price.

Define two events:

A ={candidate appears at stage m}, and B ={first m-1 applicants
m
m

rejected}, m=l, ••• , n.

Let U (m} denote the maximum expected
n

return given A and B.
m
m

Also conditioning on A, let V (m,k} be
m
n

the probability that the best applicant is chosen, given that the
candidate is held fork periods.

Finally, let v (m} denote the
n

maximum expected return, given B 1 •
m+
U (m} =
n

{m/n,
max
k=l, ••• ,n-m

V

n

Then,

(m), V (m,k)-bk},

( 1}

n

where the three bracketed terms in (1) are the returns expected
from accepting, rejecting, and holding (fork periods) the
candidate, respectively.

The second and third terms are computed

recursively:
v (m) = [U (m+l) +mv (m+l)] / (m+l),
n

n

n

(v (n) =O)

V (m,k)=[U 0 (m+l)+mV (m+l,k-1)]/(m+l),
n
n
n

( 2)

n

(V (m,O)=m/n)
n

(3)

k=l, ••• ,n-m, where u0 is the optimal return function under the
n
classical model (see (6) below).
be clear.

The interpretation of (3) should

With probability 1/(m+l) a better applicant appears at

stage m+l and we apply the classical procedure.

Otherwise, we

still hold the candidate, but for only k~l periods beyond stage
m+l.

The condition V (m,O)=m/n means merely that an expired
n

option should be exercised.
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From the recursions (2) and (3) we solve for v
in terms of U

n

n

and V (•,k)
n

and u0 respectively, obtaining
n

n
V

V

n

(4)

U (i) /i (i-1),

(m) = m E

n

i=m+l

m+k
(m,k) = m E u0 (i)/i(i-l) + m/n.
n
i=m+l n

(5)

Now, we need to review briefly the solution to the classical
problem.

There exists a positive integer, r*, such that the first
n

r*-1 applicants are rejected and the first candidate, if any,
n

observed thereafter is selected.

The optimal return function is

m/n, m~r*

u0

n

n

=

(m)

(6)

n-1
1/i , m<r* •
(r*-1)/n E
n
i=r*-1
n
n

-1

In the limit, r*/n+e ·

+
o
+
o
and U ([rn] )+U (r) as n+oo, where [p]
n

n

denotes the smallest positive integer equal to or greater than p,
and

r

u0

(r)

1e

-

r>e

-1

'

-1

, r$e

-1

, 0$r$l.

(7)

Follow the method given in Mucci [4] to obtain the infinite
model.

To standardize and extend the return functions on the unit

interval, write f (r)=U ([rn]+), h (r)=v ([rn]+), and g (r,x)=
n

+
+
V ([rn] . , [xn] ) .
n

n

n

n

.

n

Then (1) is rewritten as f (r)=
n

max
+
O<x$l-[rn] /n

+
+
{[rn] /n, h (r), g (r,x)-b[xn] }, and the expressions (4) and (5)
n
n
Now, take limits as n+oo.

can be appropriately rewritten, too.

The option alternative is dominated unless b+Oi to keep the
6

holding cost linear, suppose that nb+c~O as n+~.

Thus, f +U,
n

h +v, and g +V where
n

n

U(r) = max
{r, v(r), V(r,x)-cx},
O~x~l-r
1

= r fr U(y)dy/y

V (r)

(8)

2

(9)

V(r,x)
OSrSl.

(10)

From the continuity of V (r, •), use of "max" in (8) is

permissible; closing the interval with x=O is a trivial matter,
since V(r,O)=r.

The next section is devoted to solving (8)-(10).
3. PROOF OF THEOREM

Some abbreviated notation will be helpful.

Let w(r,x)=V(r,x)

-ex, let x*=x*(r) maximize w(r,x) on [0,1-r], and let W(r)=w(r,x*).
LEMMA 3.1

If U(r)=W(r) _for r<e
o

PROOF

Obviously, U(r)~U (r)=e

-1

-1

then r+x*~e

-1

Let c<l and suppose U(r)=W(r).

-1

, so

w (r,x)=r/(x+r)-c.

Then x*=l-r on r>c

0

If c~l, then U(r)=U (r) and (I) holds.

Using (7) and (10) and holdin•g r+x~e

-1

, we obtain

For r>c, w (r~x)>O and x*=l-r; and for rsc,
X

the maximum is achieved at x*=r/c-r.
o

-r)=e

•

D

and x*=r/c-r on rsc.

X

-1

-1

.

LEMMA 3.2

PROOF

•

Suppose r+x*<e

•

Substituting (7) into (10) yields V(r,x*)<V(r,e
W(r)<e

-1

U(r)>U (r) for some r.

Now, suppose c~l and that

Then U(r)=W(r), so r+x*~e
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-1

•

However,

.

w (r,x)~O on r+x~e

-1

X

Either r~e-l and x*=O, in which case W(r)=

•

o

V(r,O)=r=U (r), or r<e
W(r)<V(r,e

-1

-r)=e

-1

-1

and x*=e

-1

-r, in which case

o

D

=U (r).

Henceforth, assume c<l.

Also, as the next lemma shows, we may

eliminate the "r" term from (8) and just compare the reject and
hold decisions.

LEMMA 3. 3

For r<l, U(r)>r.
If r<e

PROOF

-1

o

, then U(r)~U (r)=e

-1

•

Suppose r~e

U(r)~w(r,x)=r+rlog(l+ x/r)-cx, from (7) and (10).

-1

•

Then,

For x suffi-

D

ciently small, iog(l+x/r)>cx/r, so U(r)>r.

Finally, we state a lemma which will be proved several times for
different values of rand c.

LEMMA 3.4

If W(r)>v(r), then W(s)>v(s), s>r.

The constant c 1 appearing in (II.e) is the solution of
t = exp(-3/2(t+l)).

(11)

The role of this equation becomes apparent subsequently.
convenient now to consider separately the three cases: c~e

3.1

THE CASE c~e

-1

.

First, hold r>c.

x*=l-r, so W(r)=w(r,1-r)=cr-rlogr +r-c.
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It is
-1

,

By Lemma 3.2,

PROOF of Lemma 3.4: Let D(r)=W(r)-v(r), where vis given in (9).
2
2
Then, d/dr[D(r)/r]=-1/r+c/r +U(r)/r )0, since U(r)~r.

It follows

0

that D(r) is increasing.
Now, let r be such that W(r)>v(r).

By Lemma 3.4, we may substi-

tute W(•) for U(•) in (9), obtaining v(r)=W(r)-r-crlogr+(r/2)lolr.
2

It is easy to show that 1/2log r-clogr-1<0, so v(r)<W(r). Thus, we
have established (II.c) and (III.e), with s 2=t 4 =c.
Next, keep e
ceding paragraph.

-1

<rSc and follow the approach used in the preHere, x*=r/c-r and W(r)=cr-rlogc.

of Lemma 3.4 is even simpler: d/dr[D(r)/r]=U(rYr 2 >0.

The proof
Assume W(r)>

On (e- 1 ,c] substitute W(•) for U(•), while on (c,l] use

v(r).

U(•) given in (III.e), thereby obtaining from (9), v(r)=W(r)-r/2•
2
log c+rlogclogr-crlogr-r.

2
Let f(c)=(l+l/2log c)/(logc-c).

Because r>e- 1 , it suffices to show

v(r)<W(r) provided logr>f(c).

f(c)<-1, which is readily obtained.
t 3 =e

-1

Then,

Hence, (III.d) is proved with

•

Finally, let rSe

-1

and repeat the same sort of argument.

The

optimal holding period is still x*=r/c-r and, in evaluating
V(r,x*), use Lemma 3.1 to get W(r)=cr+e
3.1, if r<ce

-1

, then v(r)>W(r).

-1

+rlogr/c.

To verify Lemma 3.4, we get

d/dr[D(r)/r]=-e- 1 /r 2+1/r+U(r)/r 2 >0, since U(r)~e- 1 •
W(r)>v(r).
(r,e

-1

Also by Lemma

Again, assume

In the computation of v(r), U(•) is given by W(•) on

] , by (III.d) on (e

-1

,cl, and by (III.e) on (c,1].

We get
2

v(r)=W(r)-rg(r), where g(r) is quadratic in logr: g(r)=l/2log r+
2

(l+c-logc)logr+l/2log c+3/2.

Hence, v(r)<W(r) if and only if
9

g(r)>O.

Let r 1 denote the larger root of g(r)=O, so r 1=r 1 (c)=
.

2

·

-1

exp(-(l+c)+logc+fci), where d=d(c)=(l+c) -2(1+c)logc-3.
.

fairly straightforward to show that ce
is strictly increasing once

-1

Sr<r 1 •

<r 1 <e

-1

and that g(r)

Hence, we have now verified

(II.a,b,d,e,f,g) and (III.b), where s 1 =t 1 =r 1 and t 2=e
Because t 2=t 3 , (III.c) is trivial.
that U(r)=v(r) on rsr 1 .

It is

-1

•

To verify (III.a), note

Then, substitute the appropriate values

for U(•), as calculated above, into (9) and solve the resulting
differential equation for v(r), given v(r 1 )=cr 1 +e- 1 +r 1 logr 1 /c.
-2 -1
Finally, note that v(r 1 ) is decreasing inc, so U(O)=v(r 1 )se +e ,
and (III.f) holds.
The remaining two cases are handled similarly.

For the sake

of parsimony, we omit most of the argument and concentrate on the
rough spots.

Once the sand t values are known, the results can

be verified directly by substitution into (8)-(10), anyway.
3.2

THE CASE cl<c<e

-1

•

Here, t 4 =t 3=e

-1

and, on r>e

W(r) is given by (III.e), as in the previous section.
x*=l-r, W(r)=cr+e

-1

+r-c, and Lemma 3.4 holds.

-1

, U(r)=

For c<rSe

-1

If U(s)=W(s) on

s>r, then v(r)=W(r)-r(3/2+(c+l)logr).

Thus, v(r)<W(r) if and only

if r>h(c), where h(c)=exp(-3/2(c+l)).

On (O,e

increasing, with h(O)>O and h(e
(11), it follows that h(c)<c.

-1

)<e

-1

•

-1

) , his concave

Because c>c 1 , as given by

Therefore, r>h(c) and (II.c) and

(III.c) are established with s 2=t 2=c.

Finally, if rsc, then

(II.a,b,f,g) and (III.a,b,f) are readily obtained as before, with
Also, ce

-1

~r 1 <c, so (II.d,e) hold.
10

,

3.3
for r>e

THE CASE csc 1 • The previous results are applicable here,

-1

r>h(c).

For c<rSe

-1

, we still get v(r)<W(r) if and only if

However, since csc 1 , h(~)~c.

hold now with s 2=t 27h(c).

Thus (II.c) and (III.c)

Furthermore, U(r)=v(r)>W(r), c<r<h(c),

and it remains to show that U(r)=v(r) on rsc.

To this end, sub-

stitute (III.c,e) for U(•) into (9) and solve the differential
equation for v, obtaining v(r)=v(s 2 )=W(s 2 )=cs 2+e- 1+s 2-c, a
constant.

For rsc, W(r)=cr+e

established.

-1

+rlogr/c<W(s 2 ), and the result is

That also proves (II.a,d,g) and (III.a), with

s 1 =t 1=h(c), and finally establishes the "if" part of (II.f).
Finally,s 1=s 2=h(c)>h(O)=e

-3/2

>c 1 e

-1

, so (II.e) and (III.f) are

verified.
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Table 1
Optimal Procedure (s 1 /n,s 2/n) and Maximal Return (Un(O)) for b=c/n(l)

Population Size (n)

Cost
(c)

25

o.o

. 24,. 24,. 6121

•2

.32,.32,.5322
.36,.36,.4823
.40,.48,.4402
.40,.88,.3842

.35
.5
.9

(1)

100
.23,.23,.5962
.29,.29,.5167
• 34,. 35,. 4671
.36,.50,.4266
.38, .90, .3733

500
.224,.224,.5920
.288,.288,.5127
.330,.350,.4633
.354,.500,.4229
.370,.900,.3705

00

.2231,.2231,.5910
.2865,.2865,.5117
,3287,.3500,.4623
.3534,.5000,.4220
.3678,.9000,.3698

For a candidate arriving at stage m, the optimal procedure
prescribes rejecting if m<s 1 , holding for a period k<n-m if
s 1 ~m<s 2 , and holding for a period n-m if m~s 2 •

